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Abstract
This paper explores the link between the house-price expectations of mortgage lenders and the
extent of subprime lending. It argues that bubble conditions in the housing market are likely to
spur subprime lending, with favorable price expectations easing the default concerns of lenders
and thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers. Since the demand
created by subprime lending feeds back onto house prices, such lending also helps to fuel an
emerging housing bubble. These ideas are illustrated in a theoretical model, and tentative
support is found in empirical work exploring the connection between price expectations and
the extent of subprime lending.
†The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, or the Fed-
eral Reserve System. This paper is available free of charge at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/publications/working-papers./Subprime Mortgages and the Housing Bubble
by
Jan K. Brueckner, Paul S. Calem, and Leonard I. Nakamura*
1. Introduction
The spectacular run-up and subsequent collapse of US housing prices over the early years
of the new century are watershed events in real-estate history, and they were accompanied by
widespread use of subprime and non-traditional mortgages. No previous brief period witnessed
such dramatic price escalation (on the order of 50 percent), and the rapid 30 percent price drop
that ensued was also unprecedented.
Researchers have expended considerable eﬀort in trying to understand these events, but
our understanding thus far is incomplete. Previous research has largely focused on assessing
the role of market fundamentals in house-price escalation and on exploring the link between
credit supply and prices. The existing literature mostly views the growth of subprime credit as
a possible cause of house-price escalation. But the present paper argues that an expansion of
subprime lending may also be a consequence of price growth. The argument is that a favorable
shift in lenders’ house-price expectations, which may follow from past price appreciation, spurs
subprime lending by easing default concerns. The resulting increase in the demand for housing
then feeds back into the market, driving up today’s housing prices. Expectations of future
price growth can therefore generate in increase in current prices by boosting the supply of
credit, feeding a housing “bubble.” The paper thus argues that subprime lending is both a
consequence and a cause of bubble conditions in the housing market. For present purposes, a
bubble is deﬁned as a rapid run-up in prices not linked to fundamentals.
These ideas are ﬁrst developed in a detailed theoretical model. The paper then presents
empirical work that searches for evidence of a link between price expectations and subprime
lending, with the results giving suggestive, though by no means deﬁnitive, support for this
hypothesis. To put these contributions in perspective, note ﬁrst that previous studies have
found little role for market fundamentals in explaining the run-up in house prices. See, for
1example, Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010), Coleman, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2008),
and Wheaton and Nechayev (2008). Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) and Pavlov and Wachter
(2011) do ﬁnd evidence of an association between higher house prices and easing of mortgage
credit standards, but since this connection does not materialize in other work, the extent to
which price escalation is explained by the supply of credit remains unclear.1 Other papers,
however, suggest a reverse causal link between prices and subprime lending like the one ex-
plored in this paper. Coleman, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2008) ﬁnd evidence of a weakening
connection between market fundamentals and house prices after 2003, concluding that price
momentum had generated a “bubble” psychology where market participants grew to expect
continuing price increases, weakening the perceived risks of subprime lending.2 Goetzman,
Peng, and Yen (2011) present direct evidence of such a reverse link. They ﬁnd a positive im-
pact of past house-price appreciation (viewed as a proxy for price expectations) on the supply
of subprime mortgage credit, as measured by loan approval rates and loan-to-income ratios.
Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) carry out a similar exercise.3 Mian and Suﬁ (2009), on
the other hand, provide an indirect test for an expectations eﬀect. Their approach compares
price growth in areas ripe for subprime lending (zip codes with low household credit scores in
1996) to price growth in non-subprime zip codes, focusing on areas with elastic housing sup-
ply. They ﬁnd no diﬀerence price escalation between these areas, concluding that the faster
expansion of mortgage credit in subprime areas could not have been driven solely by (rational)
price expectations.4
The theoretical model developed below provides a framework for understanding how sub-
prime lending is both a consequence and a cause of house-price escalation. In the model,
subprime lending is portrayed as an extension of credit to borrowers with low “default costs.”
These costs represent the penalty incurred by a borrower who defaults on a mortgage, which
include the cost of credit impairment, moving costs, and any costs associated with guilt. Sub-
prime borrowers presumably have low default costs since default will not greatly worsen a
credit standing that is already bad. Although a previous paper by Brueckner (2000) analyzed
mortgage lending when default costs are private information, the present analysis assumes
that these costs (denoted C) are observable. The model generates a minimum value of C
2below which mortgage lenders cannot proﬁtably oﬀer a mortgage, and market-level changes
that reduce this minimum will generate an expansion in subprime lending.
One such change is a shift in lender expectations regarding future house prices. With a
more optimist view of future prices, default is less of a concern for lenders, allowing them to
extend mortgages to borrowers with even lower C’s, thus leading to an expansion of subprime
lending. While the basic analysis in section 2 below makes this point, an extension of the
model allows the expansion of lending to feed back onto current house prices, bidding them
up. Section 3 of the paper goes further by embedding the model in an explicitly dynamic
setting, where a shift in expectations lasting only one period generates a long intertemporal
adjustment process.
Relative to existing work, the paper’s empirical contributions are its reliance on a direct
measure of high-risk lending (borrower credit scores) and attention to potential simultaneity
issues that arise in the econometric framework. The empirical work uses the Consumer Credit
Panel database from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, aggregated up to the state level for
2001 through 2008. The borrower-quality measure is the credit “risk score,” which is analogous
to the more familiar FICO score, being a measure of the borrower’s creditworthiness. The
dependent variable in the regressions is a state-level risk-score measure, equal to the mean
risk score for new borrowers in the state or, alternatively, the 10th or 25th percentile of the
state’s risk-score distribution. The key explanatory variable, which is intended to capture price
expectations, is the lagged annual rate of house-price appreciation, also used by Goetzmann et
al. (2011) and Dell’Arricia et al. (2008). This variable relies on the state-level CoreLogic price
index. The regressions include additional covariates as well as state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects.
While the regression is meant to test for the causal path running from price expectations
to subprime lending, the reverse path (by which subprime lending causes price escalation)
is a potential source of simultaneity bias. Steps are taken to deal with this bias, although
the remedy may be incomplete. The empirical results, presented in section 4 of the paper,
thus provide suggestive, though not deﬁnitive, evidence for a causal link between prior price
appreciation and subprime lending at the state level.5
32. The Model
2.1. The setup
The model, which draws on the framework of Brueckner (2000), is simple and stylizedalong
a number of dimensions. The ﬁrst simplifying assumption is that the mortgage term consists of
two periods, an assumption that eliminates the option aspect of the mortgage default decision,
as discussed further below. The borrower arranges a loan to purchase a standardized house of
value P0, and without loss of generality, the mortgage is assumed to be a 100 percent loan, so
that the amount borrowed equals P0. Repayment is required in the subsequent period. The
balance-due, denoted B, includes the principal P0 as well as interest, with the interest rate r
implicitly deﬁned by 1 + r = B/P0.
The value of the house in the next period is denoted P. Since P may be lower than P0, with
the house value falling over the period, the borrower may default on the mortgage. Default
occurs when P is low relative to B, in which case the borrower is better oﬀ surrendering the
house to the lender via foreclosure rather than paying oﬀ the mortgage. The resulting loss of
the low-valued housing asset is more than oﬀset by cancellation of a larger liability.
The critical value of P, below which default occurs, depends on the magnitude of default
costs. These costs, denoted C, include the cost of credit impairment, moving costs, and any
psychic costs from failing to honor the mortgage contract, as noted above.6 The role of default
costs, which are sometimes called transaction costs, has been analyzed previously by Kau,
Keenan and Kim (1993, 1994), Riddiough and Thompson (1993), Brueckner (2000), Foote,
Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and others. In the model, default costs are heterogeneous across
borrowers, ranging from a minimum value C to a maximum value of C.
The magnitude of some elements of C, and thus the outcome of the default decision, can
be aﬀected by “trigger events,” as discussed by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008).7 Thus,
default costs provide a way in which trigger events can play a role in a model that retains the
spirit of the home-equity approach to default decisions.
Taking account of default costs, the borrower defaults on the mortgage when P satisﬁes
P − B < − C. (1)
4P − B in (1) equals housing equity, which is retained by the borrower if he repays the mort-
gage and thus represents the (possibly negative) increment to wealth in the absence of default.
Conversely, −C in (1) gives the (negative) increment to wealth if default occurs. Therefore,
wealth is larger with default when housing equity is less than −C < 0. Note that the pres-
ence of default costs implies that equity must fall well below zero before default is desirable.
Rearranging, (1) shows that default is optimal when
P < B − C. (2)
Thus, default occurs when the house price is less than the mortgage balance-due less default
costs.
In contrast to the analysis of Brueckner (2000), where default costs are private information,
the current model assumes that C is observable. In reality, the borrower’s credit rating appears
to give a good picture of the default propensity, with C small (and default more likely) when
the credit score is low. The model assumes that there are no other unobserved inﬂuences on
C, which is perfectly proxied by the credit score.
With default costs thus observable, the lender tailors the mortgage contract oﬀered to
the borrower to reﬂect the observed value of C. Competition among lenders ensures that the
resulting contract generates zero lender proﬁt.
Computation of proﬁt involves a key element: lender expectations regarding the next
period’s house prices, which help determine the perceived likelihood of default. Expectations
are represented by the continuous density function f(P), which is the same for all lenders.
Generally, the density f will depend on the entire past history of house prices, which will
aﬀect both the mean and variance of the distribution of anticipated prices, perhaps through
a Bayesian updating process. The basic analysis that follows, however, does not require a
description of exactly how expectations are formed. Instead, the main focus is on the eﬀect
of an exogenous shift in expectations, conditional on a general form for f. The formation
of expectations must be speciﬁed, however, when the goal is to analyze the intertemporal
adjustment process generated by an expectations shift, as seen in section 3 below.
5Suppose the lender is risk neutral, focusing on expected proﬁt, and that he incurs a mort-
gage origination cost of k for each loan issued. Then, incorporating f and letting η < 1 denote
the lender’s discount factor, the expected present value of proﬁt from oﬀering a loan with a
balance-due of B to a borrower with default costs C is given by







Note that the lender transfers P0 to the borrower when the loan is made. In the next period, he
receives the loan balance B from the borrower over the range of house values where P ≥ B−C
holds and default does not occur. He takes possession of the house through foreclosure, earning
P from resale of the property, over the range of values where P < B − C and default does
occur. Without loss of generality, the foreclosure costs incurred by the lender are assumed to
be zero.8
Although this formulation portrays the lender as using his own money to extend the loan,
the analysis would be unaﬀected if he relied instead on borrowed funds (bank deposits). Then
the outlay of P0 would disappear from (3), being replacedby the discounted next-period interest
payment −ηzP0, where z is the lender’scost of funds. The model could also include a secondary
market for mortgages. In this case, the secondary-market investor (the loan purchaser) would
play the role of the lender.
The zero-proﬁt condition for lenders requires that π in (3) equals zero. The resulting
equation then implicitly deﬁnes a value of B that yields zero expected proﬁt for a given value
of C. Recalling that 1 + r = B/P0, the equation also implicitly deﬁnes the interest rate that
generates zero proﬁt from lending to a borrower with the given default costs.
Before deriving the relation between B and C, it is important to reiterate that the model’s
assumption of a two-period mortgage term eliminatesthe option aspect of the mortgage default
decision, which is the subject of a vast literature. For example, if the mortgage term were
three periods instead of two, then borrowers facing a low P in the second period could either
default at that point or else wait for a possible housing-market recovery in the third period.
Incorporating this waiting choice (adding an option aspect to default) would require a much
6more complicated analysis but would not qualitatively change the implications of the model.9
The option approach would still generate a default rule like (2), although the possibility of a
house-price recovery would make consumers more reluctant to default, requiring a lower P to
do so. The modiﬁed default rule would then be an input into the next section’s analysis of the
connection between B and C, and the qualitative conclusions would be unaﬀected, as would
much of the remaining analysis. Therefore, the options approach would leave the main lessons
of the analysis unchanged while introducing greater complexity.
2.2. The relation between B and C







where πC and πB are the derivatives of π with respect to these variables. Using Leibniz’s rule,
πC = η[Bf(B − C) − (B − C)f(B − C)] = ηCf(B − C) > 0. (5)
By making default less likely for a given B, higher default costs thus raise proﬁt.




f(P)dP − Cf(B − C)
￿
, (6)
where the ﬁrst term comes from diﬀerentiating under the integral in (1). The sign of (6)
is ambiguous as a result of two opposing eﬀects. First, an increase in B raises the lender’s
revenue in the event that default does not occur, an eﬀect captured by the ﬁrst term in brackets.
However, an increase in B makes default more likely, which has the opposite eﬀect and leads
to the negative second term in (6). One would expect the positive eﬀect to dominate the
second one, so that a larger balance-due raises expected proﬁt. This outcome, for example, is
guaranteed in the case where f is uniform and given by 1/(P − P) over the support [P,P] ,





which is positive under the assumption that the lender does not ask the borrower to pay back
more than the maximal anticipated next-period house price (B < P). More generally, with a
unimodal f, it can be shown that πB is positive provided that the density is not too steep over
its descending range.
Assuming that πB > 0, (4) is then negative, implying ∂B/∂C < 0. Thus, an increase
in C allows a reduction in B, with the lender setting the balance-due lower, or equivalently
charging a lower interest rate, for a better quality borrower (one with a higher C). Since such
a borrower is less likely to default, the amount B that the bank recovers when default does
not occur can be set lower. Therefore, a curve relating B to C is downward sloping over the
relevant range, as shown in Figure 1.10
That range is limited at the upper end by C, the maximal value of default costs. A
key additional assumption puts a lower limit on C. This assumption realistically imposes an
upper bound on B via a stylized form of the mortgage payment-to-income constraint. Such
a constraint has been a key feature of mortgage underwriting for decades, although income
requirements were substantially loosened for subprime borrowers in recent years.
To see the eﬀect of the payment-to-income constraint, note that the mortgage payment is
a component of B, being equal to rP0 = B−P0. Assuming that borrower incomes are uniform
and equal to y despite heterogeneous default costs, the payment-to-income constraint is written
rP0/y ≤ α for some constant α < 1. Substituting, the constraint becomes (B − P0)/y ≤ α, or
B ≤ αy + P0 ≡ b B. (8)
Let the value of C associated with b B in Figure 1 be denoted b C. Then, referring to the
ﬁgure, the B ≤ b B requirement implies C ≥ b C, so that an upper limit on the balance-due puts
a ﬂoor of b C under allowable default costs. The reason is that, in lending to a borrower with
8default costs below b C, zero proﬁt would require a balance-due above the limit ﬁxed by the
payment-to-income constraint. Thus, mortgages cannot be oﬀered to borrowers of less than a
certain quality, those with C values lying below b C. As seen in Figure 1, C is assumed to be less
than b C, so that low-quality potential borrowers in the range [C, b C] cannot get a mortgage.11
The discussion so far has implicitly assumed that borrowers will always accept an oﬀered
mortgage, regardless of the magnitude of the balance-due. In eﬀect, (owner-occupied) housing
is assumed to be essential, so that a mortgage will be accepted regardless of its cost. Thus,
the demand for mortgage funds is perfectly inelastic.
2.3. Subprime lending
In the model, subprime lending corresponds to a reduction in b C. In other words, subprime
lending gives some low-quality potential borrowers, who previously could not get a loan, access
to mortgage funds. Parametric changes in the model can generate a reduction in b C and thus
the emergence of subprime lending. Three changes in particular are of interest. The ﬁrst is a
relaxation of the payment-to-income constraint, as has occurred in recent years. The second
change is a decline in the cost of lending, perhaps reﬂecting eﬃciencygains from greater reliance
on the Internet. The third change, which is the main focus of the analysis, is a favorable shift
in the lender’s house-price expectations.
To analyze the eﬀects of these changes, the explicit condition that determines b C is needed.
This condition comes from setting π from (3) equal to zero, and then substituting b B in place
of B. The resulting condition determines the associated C value, namely b C, and it is written
− k − P0 + η





b Bf(P,δ)dP = 0. (9)
In (9), δ is a shift parameter for the house-price density. It is assumed that an increase in δ
shifts the density toward higher values in the sense of stochastic dominance. In other words,
with an increase in δ, the cumulative distribution function shifts downward at each value of P
within the support of f. Thus, the δ derivative of F(P,δ) ≡
R P
0 f(z,δ)dz satisﬁes Fδ(P,δ) < 0
over this support, where the subscript denotes partial derivative.
9Using (9), the eﬀect on b C of an increase in α, the maximum payment-to-income ratio,
is easily derived. Totally diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to α and b C, recognizing that α







where the inequality follows because πC > 0, πB is assumed positive, and ∂b B/∂α > 0 from
(8). Thus, by raising the maximum possible B, relaxation of the payment-to-income constraint
lowers the ﬂoor on C, allowing b C to fall and spurring subprime lending. In other words, by
allowing lenders to recoup a larger balance-due when default does not occur, a higher α allows
lenders to extend mortgages to borrowers of even lower quality without incurring a loss.
Similarly, since πk = −1, it follows that ∂b C/∂k = 1/πC > 0. Thus, by raising proﬁt, a
decline in mortgage-origination costs allows lenders to extend loans to lower-quality borrowers.
The eﬀect on b C of a shift in the lender’s house-price expectations requires more extensive
computation. The appendix shows that an increase in δ raises π holding b C ﬁxed, with
πδ = −η
"
CFδ(b B − b C,δ) +












A favorable shift in the house-price density thus leads to a reduction in b C, with more optimistic
price expectations spurring subprime lending. With better expectations, the perceived likeli-
hood of default declines, other things equal, allowing loans to be extended to even lower-quality
borrowers without generating a loss for the lender.
Recognizing that a shift in expectations is characteristic of a housing bubble, the results
in (10) and (12) are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. A favorable shift in the density of anticipated future house prices
(as occurs under a housing bubble) spurs subprime lending, with the caliber of the
10lowest-quality borrower falling. This eﬀect is reinforced by a relaxation of the payment-
to-income constraint or a decline in mortgage-origination costs.
2.4. Endogenizing P0
So far, the initial house price P0 has been viewed as ﬁxed despite the increase in the number
of home buyers that follows from a decline in b C. A full analysis, however, should allow P0
to be endogenous, so that it can change along with b C in response to changes in the model’s
parameters. The size of houses, however, remains ﬁxed at some standardized value.
To carry out this extension, the ﬁrst step is to relate the number of demanders of housing
to b C. Let G(C) denote the cumulative distribution function for default costs over the [C,C]
range, with G(C) = 0 and G(C) = N, the number of potential mortgage borrowers. Then, the
number of housing demanders as a function of b C is simply N −G(b C), which gives the number
of individuals with C values large enough to get a mortgage.
On the supply side, let S(P0) denote the supply function for new houses, which gives
the number of houses supplied as an increasing function of price. Supply is assumed to be
imperfectly elastic, so that S0(P0) < ∞. Note that housing production is assumed to be
instantaneous, so that producers have no need to consider prices outside of the current period.
Taking account of the supply function, the number of houses available would then equal the
stock passed on from the previous period, denoted H, plus S(P0). The condition that equates
housing supply and demand is then
Φ ≡ H + S(P0) − [N − G(b C)] = 0. (13)
While a high price generates an increase in the number of houses, so that S(P0) > 0 holds
for large values of P0, units are removed from the housing stock when P0 is low. This outcome
reﬂects the existence of some alternate use for the housing land input, which is superior when
housing commands a low price. Thus, the supply function satisﬁes S(P0) > (<) 0 when
P0 > (<) P∗, with P∗ giving the price where supply is zero.
The second equilibrium condition, which is based on (9), links P0 and b C from the lender’s
side. The required modiﬁcation comes from (8), which makes b B a function of the now-
11endogenous P0 instead of simply a constant. This function is b B(P0) ≡ αy + P0, and it
shows a positive relationship between b B and P0.12 Substituting b B(P0) in place of b B in (9),
the condition is rewritten as
− k − P0 + η





b B(P0)f(P,δ)dP = 0. (14)
Conditions (13) and (14) jointly determine equilibrium values of b C and P0.
The eﬀect on these equilibrium values of a shift in house-price expectations can be analyzed
diagrammatically. The equilibrium is the intersection of two locii in (b C,P0) space, with one
given by (13) and the other by (14). The locus given by (13), denoted the “supply-demand











where the sign follows from G0,S0 > 0.








πB(∂b B/∂P0) − 1
> 0. (16)
Given πC > 0, the inequality in (16) is a consequence of the negativity of the last denominator
expression, which is easily demonstrated.13
Figure 2 illustrates the s-d and π locii and their intersection. When house-price expec-
tations shift, with δ increasing, the π locus shifts, while the s-d locus (which is independent
of δ) remains ﬁxed. The shift in the π locus is leftward in the b C direction, as shown in the
ﬁgure. This conclusion follows given that ∂b C/∂δ|π < 0 holds from (12), which indicates that
b C falls as δ increases, holding P0 ﬁxed. As seen in Figure 2, this shift in the π locus reduces
the equilibrium value of b C while raising P0.
Since (10) shows that the π locus again shifts to the left when α increases, a relaxation of
the payment-to-income constraint has the same impacts on b C and P0 as a shift in expectations.
These same eﬀects also arise when origination costs k decline. Summarizing yields.
12Proposition 2. When the current house price P0 is endogenous, a rightward shift in
the density of anticipated future prices (as occurs under a housing bubble) raises P0
while again spurring subprime lending, with the caliber of the lowest-quality borrower
falling. A relaxation of the payment-to-income constraint or a decline in mortgage
origination costs reinforces these eﬀects.
Thus, growth in subprime lending continues to be a consequence of a shift in future house-
price expectations, a relaxation of the payment-to-income constraint or a decline in mortgage-
origination costs. In addition, all three changes feed back onto current prices, making houses
more expensive. Note, however, that if housing supply is perfectly elastic, with S0(P0) inﬁnite,
then the slope expression in (15) equals zero. The s-d locus is then ﬂat, so that an expectations
shift has no price impact (see Figure 2).14
2.5. Eventual default
The actual default decisions of borrowers occur in the subsequent period, and they depend
on the house price that emerges in that period. To analyze default, the realized value of P
must be inserted into the default condition (2) along with the balance due B owed by a given
borrower, which is shown by the curve in Figure 1. To write the balance-due as a function of
the relevant variables, let (3) be rewritten to include the shift parameter δ. Then, setting (3)
equal to zero, the condition determines B as a function of C and the other variables P0 and
δ, written as B = φ(C,P0,δ). This function is decreasing in C, as seen above, and it is also
increasing in P0 and decreasing in δ.15
Let e C denote the critical value of C that makes a borrower indiﬀerent in the subsequent
period between defaulting and not doing so. Referring to (2), e C satisﬁes
P = φ(e C,P0,δ) − e C. (17)
Since φ is decreasing in C, it follows that φ(C,P0,δ)−C is also decreasing in C, which means
that P < φ(C,P0,δ) − C holds for C < e C. Thus, after taking account of B’s dependence on
C, actual defaulters are those borrowers with the lowest default costs.
For future reference, note that (17) determines the critical value e C as function of the
remaining variables in the equation. This function, which is written e C(P,P0,δ), is decreasing
13in P given that a larger realized house value makes a borrower less prone to default, requiring
C to fall below a lower critical value to make default desirable. In addition, since a larger P0
raises B, higher default costs are required to forestall default, so that e C is increasing in P0.
Finally, since a higher δ reduces the required B, lower default costs are required to induce
default, making e C a decreasing function of δ.16
While this discussion is silent about how the realized P value is determined, this omission
is remedied below when the model is embedded in a dynamic setting.
3. Making the Model Dynamic: An Example
While the paper’s empirical work relies only on Proposition 2, further insight can be gained
by using the model to carry out a dynamic analysis. In a dynamic setting, a one-time shift in
house-price expectations leads to an intemporal adjustment process. Analysis of this process
can give insight into the evolution of housing and mortgage markets in the presence of a housing
bubble.
The ﬁrst step is to attach a time index t to P0 and b C, which are now written Pt
0 and b Ct.
The realized house price in the period following t then equals the P0 value for that period, or
Pt+1
0 . The next step is to specify exactly how the lender’s house-price expectations are formed,
a question that could be skirted in the analysis up to this point. While the expectations density
f will depend on the entire past history of house prices, as mentioned above, this dependence
is assumed to take a very simple form in order to permit a tractable analysis. Given this
limitation, the ensuing discussion should be viewed as only providing an example of how the
model might behave in a dynamic setting.
The simplifyingassumption is that the position of the density of anticipated prices depends
on the previous period’s house price, with a change in that price shifting the density without
changing its shape. Thus, the time-t density for the next period’s anticipated price is written
f(P − Pt−1
0 ), so that a given increase in Pt−1
0 shifts the density to the right by the amount
of the increase.17 This assumption could correspond, for example, to a situation where f is
symmetric and centered at Pt−1
0 , so that a change in Pt−1
0 alters the mean of the distribution
while its variance is independent of the past history. In addition, a change in expectations, as
14reﬂected in an increase in δ, is assumed to shift the density in the same way as the past price,
so that when δ is nonzero, the density is written as f(P − Pt−1
0 − δ).
Incorporating these changes, the zero-proﬁt condition (14) at time t is rewritten as












0 −δ)dP = 0.
(18)
To adapt the supply-demand condition in (13) to a dynamic setting, recall that H in (13)
is the number of housing units inherited from the previous period. Assuming that housing is
perfectly durable (unless intentionally removed from the stock), H simply equals the number
of mortgage borrowers in the previous period. Therefore, (13) at time t becomes
N − G(b Ct−1) + S(Pt
0) − [N − G(b Ct)] = 0. (19)
Finally, the dynamic setup involves a particular assumption on the fate of borrowers who
default on their mortgages.18
Since Pt−1
0 enters (18), the position of the π locus relating Pt
0 and b Ct depends on Pt−1
0 . An
increase in Pt−1
0 shifts that locus to the left, just like the increase in δ analyzed above. Similarly,
the position of the s-d locus depends on b Ct−1, with an increase in b Ct−1 shifting the locus to
the right.19 Note that, with a higher b Ct−1, a smaller housing stock is handed forward from
time t− 1, so that supply-demand equilibrium at t requires fewer current mortgage borrowers
(a higher b Ct) for any given Pt
0.
Conditions (18) and (19) constitute a system of diﬀerence equations that governs the
evolution of the b C and P0 variables over time. Suppose the economy is in a steady state up
to time τ − 1. The steady-state price equals the zero-supply price P∗, and the steady-state
b C is denoted b C∗.20 Then, suppose that the equilibrium is perturbed at time τ by a shift in
house-price expectations, with δ becoming positive. The π locus shifts as in Figure 2, with P
rising and b C falling at time τ, as shown again in Figure 3. The equilibrium moves from the
steady-state values P∗ and b C∗, which lie at the intersection of the steady-state π∗ and s-d∗
locii, to the values at the intersection of πτ and s-d∗ locii.
15At time τ + 1, the expectations shock is past, with δ returning to zero. But the time-τ
changes in P and b C aﬀect the positions of the π and s-d locii at τ + 1, following the above
discussion. Since b Cτ+1 < b C∗, the s-d locus at time τ + 1 lies to the left of the steady-state
locus, as seen in Figure 3. To locate the πτ+1 locus, it can be shown that the house price at
time τ does not rise by the full amount of the expectations shift, so that Pτ
0 < P∗ + δ.21 As
a result, the π locus at τ + 1 (whose position depends on Pτ
0 ) is not as far to the left as the
πτ locus (whose position depends on P∗ + δ), as shown in Figure 3. Given these two shifts, it
follows that the house price at τ + 1 must be lower than at τ, with Pτ+1
0 < Pτ
0 . Depending on
the exact positions of the curves, b C could either rise or fall between times τ and τ + 1, with
Figure 3 showing the latter case.22
This information can be used to investigate the time path of defaults. Letting e Ct denote,
for time t, the critical e C value below which default occurs, the default rate at t is given by
Dt =
G(e Ct) − G(b Ct−1)
N − G(b Ct−1)
. (20)
The denominator equals the number of consumers getting mortgages at t−1 (whose C values
lie above b Ct−1) and the numerator equals the number of these individuals who default at t
(whose C values lies above b Ct−1 and below e Ct). At time τ −1, the G arguments in (20) equal
the starred, steady-state values, yielding the steady-state default rate D∗.
The increase in the house price at τ reduces the incentive for default, pushing the critical
e C value below the steady-state level, so that e Cτ < e C∗.23 Since b Cτ−1 equals the steady value
b C∗, it follows from (20) that the default rate declines at time τ, with Dτ < D∗.
In moving from time τ to τ + 1, the default rate is aﬀected by changes in both e C and the
lagged b C. Diﬀerentiation of (20) shows Dt rises when b Ct−1 decreases, so that an expansion in
subprime lending raises the subsequent default rate, holding e C ﬁxed.24 Thus, the decline in
the lagged b C from b Cτ−1 = b C∗ to b Cτ < b C∗ tends to increase the default rate between times
τ and τ + 1. However, the change in e C between these periods is ambiguous.25 Although the
drop in P0 raises the incentive to default, which tends to increase e C, the higher past price and
the previous period’s expectation shift have opposing eﬀects on the balance-due owed at time
16τ + 1, which makes the direction of change in e C unclear. However, if the b C eﬀect dominates,
the default rate will rise. Summarizing yields
Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumptions, a house-price expectations shift
at time τ raises the current house price P0 above the steady-state level while reducing
the default rate D at τ relative to its own steady-state level. In the subsequent period
(τ + 1), the house price falls relative to the level at time τ. The change in the default
rate is ambiguous, but a large expansion in subprime lending at τ will tend to make it
positive.
The ambiguity regarding Dτ+1 as well as the evolution beyond time τ +1 can be explored
numerically. The calculations assume that the density f at time t is uniform, with height 1/2µ
over the interval [P,P] = [Pt−1
0 +δ −µ,Pt−1
0 +δ+µ]. In addition, default costs are uniformly
distributed, and the supply function is linear.
Under the parameter values listed in the appendix, P∗ = 5.0 and b C∗ = 2.2. At time τ, P0
rises to 5.36 and b C falls dramatically to 0.67, as seen in Figure 4. From a steady-state value of
1.7 percent, the default rate at time τ drops to zero, as seen in Figure 5. At time τ +1, P0 falls
almost all the way back to the steady-state value, dropping to 5.01, while b C declines further
to 0.57 (matching Figure 3). The previous period’s expansion of subprime lending dominates
in determining the change in the default rate, which surges to 40 percent at time τ + 1, a
number that approximates actual experience.26 At time τ + 2, the house price drops below
the steady-state level while b C rises almost back to b C∗, indicating a drop in subprime lending.
The default rate declines only slightly.27
The subsequent evolution of P0 and b C is depicted in Figure 4, which shows convergence
back to the steady state.28 Close inspection of the adjustment paths shows that they exhibit the
cyclical convergence seen in Figure 3, an outcome that is robust to variations in the underlying
parameter values. Figure 5 shows that the default rate also convergences cyclically back to its
steady-state value, spending several periods at zero before returning to D∗.
Given the analytical and simulation results, several observations can be made about the
intertemporal path generated by the shock to house-price expectations. In response to the
initial shock, subprime lending surges as b C declines, and the resulting increase in demand
pushes up the current house price and enlarges the housing stock. While this price increase
17partly sustains favorable price expectations for the subsequent period, the optimism is weaker
than under the initial shock. This fact (captured in the π locus’s rightward shift), together with
the larger housing stock handed forward from time τ (reﬂected in the s-d locus’s leftward shift),
pushes down the housing price at time τ +1. This drop, along with the presence of new low-C
borrowers, leads to a spike in defaults. As the adjustment process continues, subprime lending




The discussion now turns to a description of the empirical work motivated by Proposition 2.
Credit risk scores, drawn from the New York Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel database, are used
to measure the extent of subprime lending in a state. The database is a 5 percent sample of
the entire US credit-bureau population (individuals with credit information), taken as a panel,
with the same set of social security numbers drawn each quarter. The risk-score measures are
scaled like the FICO scores that are also commonly used as a criterion for mortgage lending
(the sample score range is from 280 to 850). In the data, the borrower’s risk score is tabulated
when a new mortgage is originated in a given quarter. Risk scores are then aggregated by state
for each quarter, with the state’s mean score, the 10th percentile score, and the 25th percentile
score computed. The sample covers the 32 quarters running from 2001Q1 to 2008Q4.
The sample of borrowers is split into repeat home buyers, reﬁnancers, investors and ﬁrst-
time buyers. A repeat buyer is a borrower who had a previously recordedmortgage and changed
address upon receivingthe new mortgage. A reﬁnancer is a borrower with a previously recorded
mortgage who did not change address in the quarter before or the two quarters after receiving
the new mortgage. An investor is a borrower who had two additional ﬁrst-lien mortgages with
positive balances when the new mortgage was received.
Identiﬁcation of ﬁrst-time home buyers is less straightforward than for these other cate-
gories. A ﬁrst-time buyer is a borrower who did not have a recorded mortgage in the prior four
quarters, who was 40 years old or younger, and whose oldest account still active (as recorded by
18the credit bureau) was less than or equal to 240 months from its time of origination. Although
some households could have paid oﬀ an unobserved previous mortgage well before borrowing
again, thus looking like ﬁrst-time buyers, the restriction to households no older than 40 with
credit histories shorter than 20 years lessens the chance of such misidentiﬁcation, since few bor-
rowers with these characteristics could have paid oﬀ a previous mortgage. Another potential
problem is that some prior mortgages may not be recorded in credit-bureau records, although
in recent years this oversight is likely to be uncommon.
Additional variables include quarterly state house price indexes from CoreLogic, quarterly
state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Conference Board’s
quarterly regional Consumer Conﬁdence Index for the nine U.S. Census regions. Another
variable is real quarterly state personal income, constructed by Haver Analytics from state
personal income data deﬂated using the PCE chained price index, both from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. These latter three variables, which were downloaded from Haver DLX
databases, control for demand-side eﬀects, including the possibility that the risk composition
of borrowers varies with the economic cycle.30
4.2. Empirical framework
Empirical work exploring the connection between lender price expectations and subprime
lending must confront two challenges. First, how are price expectations to be measured?
Second, given that subprime lending feeds back onto house prices, with a possible eﬀect on
price expectations themselves, how can the causal eﬀect of expectations on lending be isolated?
The ﬁrst challenge is met by using past price appreciation as a proxy for lender expectations
regarding future prices. When past appreciation is rapid, lenders are assumed to expect higher
future prices than when past appreciation is moderate. Recall that the model of section 3
assumed that the location of the density of anticipated house prices depended on the level
of the previous period’s price (with an expectations shock shifting the density in the same
way as an increase in the past price). By assuming that rapid past price appreciation, rather
than a high past price level, produces favorable expectations for the future price, the empirical
work takes a diﬀerent, more realistic approach. Note that in this setting, an expectations
shock and an exogenous increase in past appreciation would have equivalent eﬀects. Observe
19also that the empirical work does not provide an internal test of the assumption that lenders
extrapolate past appreciation forward in predicting future house prices. But such behavior
seems reasonable, and it is supported by indirect evidence.31
Before discussing the second challenge (feedback from subprime lending to house prices), it
is useful to consider preliminary empirical results that do not seriously address it. Once these
results have been digested, the simultaneity problem is explored in more detail. The empirical
model, which captures the connection between subprime lending and price expectations, relates
the aggregate risk-score measure in state j in quarter t, denoted RISKSCOREjt, to the one-
year (4-quarter) lag of annual house-price appreciation, denoted HPICHGjt−4. This variable
is computed as (HPIjt−4 − HPIjt−8)/HPIjt−8, where HPI is house-price index. Faster
past appreciation is expected to reduce the risk-score measure, indicating an expansion of
subprime lending. Note that by using the lagged appreciation rate, rather than an appreciation
rate ending at the current quarter (which may be aﬀected by contemporaneous lending), the
simultaneity problem is lessened. As seen below, however, this approach does not eliminate it.
The regression equation is
RISKSCOREjt = β0 + β1HPICHGjt−4 + β2Xjt + ￿jt, (21)
where ￿jt is an error term and β1 is negative. Xjt is a vector of additional covariates that also
help determine RISKSCOREjt. These variables include the state unemployment rate for the
given quarter (UNRjt), per capita income (PCjt), and the regional consumer conﬁdence index
(CCjt). Also included in Xjt are state ﬁxed eﬀects, captured by a vector S of state dummy
variables that equals Sj for state j, and quarterly ﬁxed eﬀects, captured by a vector T of
quarter dummy variables that equals Tt for quarter t.32
By capturing economic well-being at the household level, UNRjt and PCjt help determine
borrower creditworthiness and thus individual risk scores, so that their presumed eﬀects on
the aggregate measure are respectively negative and positive.33 The consumer-conﬁdence
variable may help determine lender optimism about the future, while also capturing economic
well-being. Under the ﬁrst interpretation, an increase in CCjt should lead to a reduction
20in the aggregate risk-score measure as lenders serve riskier borrowers, but under the second
interpretation, the eﬀect of CCjt could be positive. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for
the variables used in the model and gives their deﬁnitions. One noteworthy comparison is that
each of the three RISKSCORE measures for ﬁrst-time buyers is lower than the corresponding
measure for the other borrower groups.
Borrower risk scores and prior house-price appreciation may be linked for a reason diﬀerent
from the one envisioned in the model, and separate estimation of equation (21) for each of the
four diﬀerent borrower groups helps to distinguish between these linkages. To see the problem,
note that rapid prior appreciation will raise the home equity of repeat buyers and reﬁnancers,
making a larger downpayment, and hence lower loan-to-value ratio, feasible on a new house
purchase. The resulting reduction in default risk may in turn make lenders more willing
to extend mortgages to borrowers with lower risk scores, generating an inverse relationship
between prior appreciation and risk scores like that predicted by the model. This linkage,
however, is not present for ﬁrst-time buyers, who enjoy no wealth gain from prior appreciation.
Therefore, the regression for ﬁrst-time buyers provides a crucial way of distinguishing between
these two sources of correlation between prior appreciation and borrower risk scores.
4.3. Preliminary results
Table 2 shows the preliminary regression results, where (21) is estimated by ordinary least
squares. Three regressions are reported for each borrower group, with the mean, 10th and
25th percentile risk scores as dependent variables. In order to give bigger states (with their
larger number of mortgage borrowers) more weight, (21) is estimated in weighted fashion, with
quarterly observations for each state weighted by the average annual borrower count for the
state. Signiﬁcance tests are based on robust standard errors.
Except in the 10th percentile regression for ﬁrst-time buyers, all the β1 estimates in Table
2 are signiﬁcantly negative at the 5 percent level or better, showing that higher past price
appreciation reduces borrower risk scores. These results are consistent with Proposition 2,
and the fact that signiﬁcant estimates also emerge for the ﬁrst-time borrowers discounts the
housing-equity eﬀect discussed above as the source of the ﬁndings. It should be noted that the
weak 10th-percentile result for this group could be due to the very low risk-score range that
21this value represents (in the 500’s, compared to the 600’s for repeat buyers), which probably
reﬂects low household incomes. With an increasingly binding payment-to-income constraint
from higher house prices eroding aﬀordability for this group, any eﬀect of a relaxation of
underwriting standards may be hard to detect.
The eﬀects of the other covariates vary across borrower groups. The consumer conﬁdence
index has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the risk score for all groups except investors, sug-
gesting that CCt is capturing current economic well-being, which generates high borrower risk
scores, rather than proxying favorable lender expectations about the future, which would en-
courage lending to riskier borrowers. A higher per capita income raises risk scores in almost all
cases for reﬁnancers and ﬁrst-time buyers, as expected, but the eﬀects for the other groups are
mostly insigniﬁcant. Unexpectedly, the unemployment rate has virtually no eﬀect on borrower
risk scores.
4.4. An attempt to address the simultaneity problem
As explained above, use of the lagged appreciation rate partly circumvents a simultaneity
problem in the regression that would be present had annualized appreciation through the
current quarter been used instead. In other words, whereas fast annual appreciation up to the
current quarter could encourage subprime lending, the feedback eﬀect from this lending would
raise current house prices and thus the measured rate of appreciation through the current
period. Price appreciation would then be aﬀected by subprime lending as well as being a cause
of it, precluding isolation of the expectations eﬀect. However, since prices one year back cannot
be aﬀected by current subprime lending, use of the lagged appreciation rate helps address the
simultaneity problem.
Nevertheless, a residual simultaneity eﬀect may remain as a consequence of serial corre-
lation in the error terms in (21). To understand this point, observe that the feedback eﬀect
from subprime lending to prices can be captured by an equation relating HPICHGjt−4 to
RISKSCOREjt−4 and additional covariates Zjt−4, which is written
HPICHGjt−4 = γ0 + γ1RISKSCOREjt−4 + γ2Zjt−4 + ηjt−4. (22)
22Note that since an expansion of subprime lending at quarter t−4 (a lower RISKSCOREjt−4)
raises price appreciation through that date by raising t−4’s price, it follows that γ1 < 0 holds.
The Zjt−4 vector could include the annual rates of changes in the X variables UNR, PCI and
CC, all of which are shifters of housing demand, as well the annual rate of population change
for the state. It is natural to assume that the error term η in (22) is uncorrelated with ￿ from
(21), with ηjr and ￿ks being uncorrelated for any r, s, j and k.
To see that serial correlation in the ￿’s poses a threat to consistent estimation, let (21)
be lagged four quarters to generate RISKSCOREjt−4, with the result substituted into (22).
After simplifying, the resulting equation can be written
HPICHGjt−4 = θ0 + θ1HPICHGjt−8 + θ2Xjt−4 + γ2Zjt−4 + γ1￿jt−4 + ηjt−4, (23)
where θ1 = γ1β1 and θ2 = γ1β2. Because HPICHGjt−4 depends on ￿jt−4 from (23),
HPICHGjt−4 in (21) will be correlated with the error term ￿jt if the ￿’s are themselves
serially correlated. This correlation will in turn bias the OLS estimates of (21).
Serial correlation in the ￿’s would arise through serial correlation in unobserved, time-
varying determinants of the extent of subprime lending in a state. While the pattern of serial
correlation could in principle be very complex, suppose that ￿ follows a simple annual AR
process. In this case, ￿jt = ρ￿jt−4+vjt, where ρ is the autoregressive parameter and the vjt are
i.i.d. error terms.34 Successive substitution shows that ￿jt then depends on vjt,vjt−4,vjt−8,....
Under the AR1 assumption, an autoregressive tranformation yields an estimating equation
purged of correlation between the covariates and the error term. Lagging (21) by four quarters,
multiplying by ρ and subtracting the result from (21) yields
RISKSCOREjt = (1 − ρ)β0 + ρRISKSCOREjt−4 + β1HPICHGjt−4
− ρβ1HPICHGjt−8 + β2Xjt − ρβ2Xjt−4 + vjt (24)
Since HPICHG depends on the contemporaneous ￿ from (23), it depends on the contempora-
neous v and all the earlier v’s. As a result, HPICHGjt−4 and HPICHGjt−8 do not depend on
23v’s later than vjt−4, which means that these variables are independent of vjt. Thus, (24) lacks
the correlation between the covariates and the error term that prevents consistent estimation
of (21).
If the error structure is more complex than the simple AR1 structure, the error term in an
equation generated by an autoregressive transformation of (21) would involve additional terms,
which may still be correlated with the right-hand variables. Recognizing this potential pitfall,
it is nevertheless worthwhile estimating (24) under the assumption that the AR1 structure is
correct. To estimate such a model, the usual approach would rely on the OLS residuals from
(21) to estimate ρ, with the result substituted in (24) and the β coeﬃcients then estimated
by OLS. However, since OLS estimation of (21) is inconsistent given the correlation between
HPICHGjt−4 and the error term, the resulting estimate of ρ is inconsistent as well. A diﬀerent
approach that circumvents this problem is to estimate (24) by nonlinear least squares.
4.5. Additional results
Nonlinear least squares estimates of (24) are presentedin Tables 3–6, which separately show
results for the diﬀerent borrower groups. Results are also presented for the alternative case
where (21) uses a two-quarter rather than four-quarter lag of annual house-price appreciation,
HPICHGjt−2 = (HPIjt−2−HPIjt−6)/HPIjt−6 rather than HPICHGjt−4. The regressions
are again weighted and rely on robust standard errors.35
Table 3 shows the nonlinear estimation results for repeat buyers. The second column,
which uses the mean risk score and the same four-quarter lag as in Table 2, yieldsa signiﬁcantly
negative β1 estimate and a signiﬁcant ρ estimate of about 0.2. The β1 coeﬃcient is smaller
in absolute value than in Table 2’s OLS regression, suggesting that the estimate under OLS
is downward biased. This conclusion in fact follows from the model, as can be seen by noting
that the inverse relationship between HPICHGjt−4 and ￿jt−4 from (23) (recall γ1 < 0) means
that a negative correlation exists between HPICHGjt−4 and the error term ￿jt in (21) (equal
to ρ￿jt−4 + vt) when ρ > 0, leading to downward bias in the OLS estimate of β1.
The third column of the Table shows the regression results when the lag in (21) is two
quarters rather than four, with HPICHGjt−4 replaced by HPICHGjt−2. The β1 estimate
remains signiﬁcantly negative while falling in absolute value, and the ρ estimate is now larger
24at 0.26, a diﬀerence that makes sense given the shorter lag. The regressions shown in the
remaining blocks of Table 2 use the 10th and 25th percentile risk scores as dependent variables,
and the β1 coeﬃcients increase in absolute value relative to the mean-score regressions while
remaining signiﬁcantly negative. The estimated β1’s in the 4-quarter-lag regressions are again
smaller in absolute value than the corresponding OLS estimates from Table 2.36
To gauge the quantitative implications of the results, note that the mean regressions in
Table 3 imply that a 10 percentage-point increase in past annual house-price appreciation
reduces the mean risk score among repeat buyers by about 4 points. According to the model,
this reduction comes from a decrease in the minimum risk score (b C) due to an expansion in
subprime lending. Further analysis shows this drop in the lowest risk score will equal some
multiple of the 4-point decrease in the mean score.37 Thus, the results are consistent with an
appreciable reduction in the risk score of the worst borrowers receiving mortgages in response
to higher past price appreciation price.
Table 4 shows the results for the case of reﬁnancers. All the β1 coeﬃcients are again
signiﬁcantly negative, with the magnitudes for the 4-quarter-lag case again smaller in absolute
value than the corresponding OLS estimates from Table 2. The ﬁrst-time buyer results are
shown in Table 5, and the β1 estimates are again signiﬁcantly negative when the dependent
variable is the mean risk score or the 25th percentile score. While the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant
when the dependent variable is the 10th percentile risk score (as in Table 2), the fact that the
anticipated negative eﬀect of the lagged HPICHG still emerges for ﬁrst-time buyers near
the bottom of the risk score distribution (at the 25th percentile) and at the mean tends to
discount the alternate equity-based explanation for the results. Table 6 shows the regressions
for investors, and the results once again show signiﬁcantly negative β1 coeﬃcients.38 The
estimated coeﬃcients of the consumer conﬁdence and income variables are again frequently
positive and signiﬁcant in the non-investor regressions, with an unemployment eﬀect again
mostly absent.
As mentioned in the introduction, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Goetzmann et al. (2011)
estimate a model similar to (21). But instead of relying on a borrower risk-score measure,
their dependent variable is the loan approval rate (or disapproval rate in the case of the ﬁrst
25paper), measured at the MSA level. As is done here, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) use a panel
data set over the period 2000-2006, with price appreciation lagged one year as the right-hand
variable. By contrast, Goetzmann et al. (2011) rely on a cross-section regression for 2006, with
price appreciation measured from 1999 through 2005. Although the approach of Dell’Ariccia
et al. entails the same simultaneity problem confronted here (which they acknowledge), the
problem is unaddressed. However, since Goetzmann et al. measure past appreciation over a
longer period, simultaneity may be less of a concern in their work. The results of both papers
match the present ﬁndings: rapid past price appreciation raises the loan approval rate (or
reduces the disapproval rate).
4.6. Discussion
The results presented so far appear to oﬀer support for the hypothesis that favorable lender
price expectations can spur subprime lending. However, this conclusion hinges on the untested
claim that past house-price appreciation is an appropriate expectations measure, and that a
simple one-period lag of annual appreciation is the right variable (rather than, say, a distributed
lag). In addition, the aﬃrmative interpretation of the results requires some conﬁdence that the
paper’s empirical procedures have at least partly surmounted a diﬃcult endogeneity problem.
If readers are willing to grant the ﬁrst claim but lack the conﬁdence in the eﬃcacy of the
empirical procedures, then additional empirical steps could be undertaken.
One approach would be to pursue an instrumental variables strategy for dealing with
correlation between HPICHGjt−4 and the error term in (21). Successive substitution in (23)
shows that HPICHGt−4 depends on the values of the X and Z variables at time t − 4 and
earlier. In view of this structure, a possible IV approach would consist of regressing HPICHG
on a series of lagged X and Z values and then using the ﬁtted values in place of HPICHGt−4
in (21). However, since the dynamic setting means that the model does not ﬁt into the usual
two-stage-least-squares framework, the statistical properties of the resulting estimates are not
entirely clear.39 But the results are similar to those in Tables 2–6, with the β1 estimates
signiﬁcantly negative for repeat buyers and reﬁnancers and marginally signiﬁcant for ﬁrst-time
buyers. This alternate approach may thus increase conﬁdence that an expectations eﬀect is
truly present in the data.40 At a minimum, though, the paper’s empirical results provide
26suggestive, though not necessarily deﬁnitive, evidence for the presence of such an eﬀect, which
is reinforced by the similar ﬁndings of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Goetzmann et al. (2011).
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored the link between the house-price expectations of mortgage lenders
and the extent of subprime lending. It argues that bubble conditions in the housing market are
likely to spur subprime lending, with favorable price expectations easing the default concerns
of lenders and thus increasing their willingness to extend loans to risky borrowers. Since the
demand created by this subprime lending feeds back onto house prices, the lending also helps
to fuel an emerging housing bubble. The paper, however, focuses mostly on the reverse causal
linkage, where subprime lending is a consequence rather than a cause of bubble conditions.
The paper’s theoretical model portrays subprime lending as the extension of loans to risky
borrowers with low observable “default costs,” and the analysis demonstrates that a favorable
shift in house-price expectations spurs such lending. By showing that borrower riskiness indeed
rises (risk scores fall) when a proxy for expectations (past price appreciation) becomes more
favorable, the empirical work provides suggestive evidence that such an expectations eﬀect
may be at work. But further empirical research is clearly needed to supplement this evidence.
By providing formal theoretical grounding for a link between price expectations and sub-
prime lending, and by oﬀering a new empirical test, the paper advances our understanding
of the housing crisis. A better understanding of this watershed economic event is crucial in




Integrating by parts, the proﬁt expression in (9) can be rewritten as
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Diﬀerentiating (a1) with respect to δ yields (11).
Simulation assumptions
The height of the uniform default-cost density is 1/g, where g = C−C, and the cumulative
distribution function in (19) is then G(b C) = (b C − C)/g (the mass N of potential mortgage
borrowers is normalized to unity). Furthermore, with linear housing supply, S(Pt
0) ≡ nPt
0 −k,
implying P∗ = k/n. Given these latter assumptions, (19) reduces to
b Ct − b Ct−1 + g(nPt
0 − k) = 0. (a2)
Letting a ≡ αy, so that B(Pt
0) = a + Pt
0, and assuming η = 1, (18) reduces to
(b Ct)2 − (a + Pt
0)2 + (Pt−1
0 + δ − µ)[2(a + Pt
0) − (Pt−1
0 + δ − µ)] + 4aµ = 0. (a3)
To carry out the simulation, (a2) is used to eliminate b Ct in (a3), so that Pt
0 can be written
as a function of the prior values Pt−1
0 and b Ct−1. With Pt
0 then known given these values,
substitution in (a2) determines b Ct as a function of Pt−1
0 and b Ct−1. The time paths shown in
Figure 4 reﬂect the following additional parameter values: a = 2.28, µ = 4.5, k = 10, n = 2
and g = 4. Given the highly stylized nature of the model, real-world evidence was not relevant
in the choice of parameter values. The values were selected to generate a simulation that best
illustrates the properties of the model.
Under these parameter values, B < P holds at each point in time for all borrowers, so that
πB in (7) is positive as assumed (note that B−C < P then also holds). In addition, assuming
C = 0, the condition B − C > P is satisﬁed at each point in time for all borrowers.
To compute default rates, the uniformity assumption is imposed in (18) (lagged one period),
and the condition is solved for B to yield
B = Pt−2
0 + µ + δ −
￿





This solution with C replaced by e C is then substituted into the condition Pt
0 = B − e C to yield








Figure 1: The relationship between B and C 
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
    First time buyers  Repeat buyers  Refinancers  Investors 
  N   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Mean   SD  
Risk score – mean  
RISKSCOREM 
1600  689.0 15.47 722.62 12.96 715.6 16.36 735.3 17.44 
Risk score – 10th percentile  
RISKSCORE10 
1600  585.4 20.52 627.66 20.89 610.4 25.61 649.0 29.39 
Risk score – 25th percentile  
RISKSCORE25 
1600  636.4 20.26 683.70 18.21 669.8 23.90 698.9 25.52 
Unemployment rate  
UNR 
1600  4.92 1.17  4.92  1.17 4.92 1.17 4.92 1.17 
Consumer confidence ind. 
CC 
1600  95.52 21.90  95.52  21.90 95.52 21.90 95.52 21.90 
State house price inflation  
HPICHG 
1600  5.23 8.07  5.23  8.07 5.23 8.07 5.23 8.07 
Per capita income 
PCI 
1600  35.25 11.54  35.25  11.54 35.25 11.54 35.25 11.54   35
 
Table 2. OLS RISKSCORE regressions by buyer type – 2001Q1 – 2008Q4 
  Repeat buyers  Refinancers  First-time buyers  Investors 





















































































































































Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: **1%, *5% 








Table 3. Nonlinear RISKSCORE regressions for repeat buyers – 2001Q1 – 2008Q4  
  Mean 10
th Percentile  25
th Percentile 
  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  NL: 2Q lag



























(0.046)    -0.625** 
(0.086)    -0.637** 
(0.071)   
HPICHGt-2 
(β1)    -0.395** 
(0.048)    -0.501** 












































Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: **1%, *5% 
N=1600 for each regression. The regressions use robust standard errors, and coefficients of the quarter and 






Table 4. Nonlinear RISKSCORE regressions for refinancers – 2001Q1 – 2008Q4  
  Mean 10
th Percentile  25
th Percentile 
  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag 



























(0.051)    -0.687** 
(0.118)    -0.608** 
(0.082)   
HPICHGt-2 
(β1)    -0.464** 
(0.064)    -0.679** 












































Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: **1%, *5% 
N=1600 for each regression. The regressions use robust standard errors, and coefficients of the quarter and 









Table 5. Nonlinear RISKSCORE regressions for first time buyers – 2001Q1 – 2008Q4 
  Mean 10
th Percentile  25
th Percentile 
  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag 



























(0.044)    0.100 
(0.060)    -0.176** 
(0.065)   
HPICHGt-2 
(β1)    -0.162** 
(0.044)    -0.082 












































Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: **1%, *5% 
N=1600 for each regression. The regressions use robust standard errors, and coefficients of the quarter and 








Table 6. Nonlinear RISKSCORE regressions for investors – 2001Q1 – 2008Q4  
  Mean 10
th Percentile  25
th Percentile 
  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag  4Q lag  2Q lag 



















































































Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance: **1%, *5% 
N=1600 for each regression. The regressions use robust standard errors, and coefficients of the quarter and  
state dummy variables are not reported. 
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Errors or shortcomings, however, are our responsibility.
1Neither Coleman, LaCour-Little and Vandell (2008) nor Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko
(2010) ﬁnd an association between credit supply (the subprime share and loan approval
rates, respectively) and price escalation. Wheaton and Nechayev (2008), on the other hand,
show that a regression relating prices to economic fundamentals through 1998 under-predicts
prices during the subsequent 1998-2005 period. The forecast errors from this regression are
larger in MSAs with substantial subprime lending activity, suggesting a connection between
such lending and price growth. Pavlov and Wachter (2011) ﬁnd that regions with a high
incidenceof subprime and non-traditional credit experiencedlarger price increases than areas
with low concentrations of such lending.
2Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) argue against the presence of bubble conditions as of
2004 by showing that the user-cost of owner-occupied housing (based on historical appreci-
ation rates) was similar to rent levels across diﬀerent MSAs. Under bubble conditions, user-
cost would be far below current rents. Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2010) demonstrate
that this implication of the standard user-cost model is not robust to incorporating mean-
reverting interest rates, mobility, prepayment, elastic housing supply, and credit-constrained
home buyers. They present an empirical analysis that suggests that low interest rates can
explain only one-ﬁfth of the rise in prices from 1996 through 2006, thus arguing that expec-
tations likely played a signiﬁcant role in generating the housing bubble.
3Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order (2011) suggest a variation on this argument, whereby
favorable expectations of future credit performance are a consequence of biases in risk mod-
els. They argue that when the model calibration period is economically favorable, lenders
underestimate default likelihoods “and misjudge the eﬃcacy of their models,” while “the
opposite occurs when economic conditions are unfavorable.”
4Instead, Mian and Suﬁ (2009) conclude that supply factors, including relaxation of under-
writing standards and the growth of mortgage securitization, played an important role.
5Recent papers in macroeconomics explore the factors that generate price volatility and bub-
bles in the housing market. Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) present an empirical
analysis showing a link between expectations and boom-bust housing cycles. Arce and
L´ opez-Salido (2011) view a housing bubble as an equilibrium where houses are held only
for resale (not generating rent or utility) and show that a low downpayment requirement is
42required to sustain such an equilibrium. Iacoveillo and Neri (2010) use a calibrated DSGE
model to explore the sources of volatility in house prices. All this work draws on the classic
paper of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which demonstrated the eﬀect of collateral constraints
on the dynamic behavior of the economy.
6Using survey data, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2011) provide the ﬁrst concrete evidence
showing that moral attitudes aﬀect the willingness to default. They also show that anger
about the economic situation makes default more likely.
7For example, moving costs may be an element of C in the absence of a trigger event, while
disappearing from C when a trigger event is present, as follows. Without a trigger event
that requires a move, moving costs will be zero in the absence of default (in which case the
borrower stays in the house), but the cost will be positive with default, in which case a move
is required. In this case, moving cost is an element of C. Suppose instead that a trigger
event such as unemployment occurs. Then, assuming the house becomes unaﬀordable, the
borrower must move regardless of whether default occurs, so that moving costs no longer
represent part of default costs. Thus, the trigger event depresses C, making default more
likely, as seen in the ensuing discussion.
8The density f(P) is presumably positive only over a subinterval within [0,∞], which can be
denoted [P,P]. For (3) to be relevant, B − C must lie within this interval. Otherwise, the
probability of default is either zero or one.
9In particular, borrower price expectations, which currently play no role, would aﬀect the
default decision and would thus need to enter the analysis.
10The curve is drawn as linear even though other shapes are possible. The same point applies
to Figure 2 below.
11Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) analyze a model with credit rationing, where all borrowers similarly
cannot get a loan. The mechanism is diﬀerent, however, since borrower riskiness is unob-
servable. In this setting, a market-clearing increase in the interest rate may reduce lender
proﬁts by discouraging less-risky borrowers from applying for loans (making it optimal to
leave the rate at a level that elicits excess demand for funds).
12The reason is that, since P0 is a component of B, with the remainder equal to the interest
payment, a larger P0 would shrink that payment if b B were held ﬁxed, pushing it below αy.
For the interest payment to remain at its maximal level, b B must then increase with P0.
13Negativity follows because ∂b B/∂P0 = 1 and πB < 1. Referring to (6), this latter inequality
43follows because η ≤ 1 and the integral in (6) is less than unity.
14It could be argued that the model should include a class of housing investors, who buy houses
and resell them for proﬁt in the next period. If investors have the same price expectations
as lenders, then the expected return (computed using these expectations) from this activity
might equal a ﬁxed riskless return. While this addition would provide another way of pinning
down P0, investors are omitted from the model on the belief that their role in the single-
family housing market is small relative to that of owner-occupants.
15These conclusions follow because the modiﬁed version of (3) is increasing in B, decreasing
in P0, and increasing in δ.
16These properties follow from diﬀerentiation of (17) and use of the properties of the φ function.
17This property follows because, if Pt−1
0 is increased by an amount ￿, then P must also be
increased by ￿ to keep the height of the density at its original value.
18These borrowers are assumed to reenter the pool of potential mortgage borrowers without
penalty. The potential-borrower pool thus consists of the same individuals from period to
period, who need a mortgage to repurchase the housing they just relinquished either through
sale or default. In reality, borrowers who default enter the rental market for housing, which
is suppressed under the current setup. This suppression is not completely unrealistic given
that renter status for defaulters is typical temporary, with new mortgages available to them
after a few years. Another point is that any capital gains earned upon sale of a house do
not aﬀect a borrower’s ability to secure another mortgage. By aﬀecting wealth, not income,
these gains do not loosen the payment-to-income constraint, and they cannot be used for a
downpayment given the assumption of 100 percent loans.
19When b Ct−1 increases, b Ct must increase holding Pt
0 ﬁxed to maintain the equality in (19).
20b Ct−1 = b Ct must hold in the steady state, so that the number of borrowers 1 − G(b C) and
thus the number of houses is constant over time. From (19), this requirement implies Pt
0 =
P∗, ensuring that housing supply equals zero and that the stock is thus constant. Then,
substituting Pt
0 = Pt−1
0 = P∗ into (18) (along with δ = 0), the condition yields a steady-state
value for b C, denoted b C∗.
21This conclusion follows from computing ∂P0/∂δ = −πδ/πP0 from (18) and showing that it
is less than unity. Since the upward shift in the π locus is thus less than δ, it follows from
Figure 2 that the increase in P0 must also be less than δ. In other words, given the negative
slope of the s-d locus, the increase in P0 must be smaller than the vertical shift of the π
44locus, which is itself less than δ.
22The relation between b Cτ+1 and b Cτ depends on whether Pτ+1
0 is above or below P∗. If
Pτ+1
0 > P∗ holds, then the housing stock is growing, and the number of mortgage borrowers
must be rising, implying b Cτ+1 < b Cτ, as in Figure 3. If Pτ+1
0 < P∗, then the housing stock
is shrinking, implying b Cτ+1 > b Cτ.
23To see this point, recall that the function e C(P,P0,δ) from above indicates that the critical
C value below which default occurs depends on the realized price (P), last period’s price
(P0), and the position of last period’s anticipated house-price density, as captured by δ. In
the dynamic setting, the critical value e Cτ at time τ is found by replacing P in this function
by Pτ
0 , P0 by P∗ (the price at τ − 1), and δ by P∗, recognizing that the density position in
the previous period is now represented by the lagged price (in this case Pτ−2
0 = P∗) plus the
expectations shift, which is zero at time τ −1. Thus, e Cτ = e C(Pτ
0 ,P∗,P∗). By contrast, the
steady-state value e C is given by e C∗ = e C(P∗,P∗,P∗). Since, from above, e C is decreasing in
its ﬁrst argument, it follows that e Cτ < e C∗, so that the critical value declines at τ.
24The derivative of Dt with respect to b Ct−1 has the sign of G0(b Ct−1)[G(e Ct) − N] < 0.
25The critical e C value at time τ +1 is given by e Cτ+1 = e C(Pτ+1
0 ,Pτ
0 ,P∗ +δ), recognizing that
the position of the density at τ is captured by the lagged price Pτ−1
0 = P∗ plus the time-τ
expectations shift. Relative to e Cτ = e C(Pτ
0 ,P∗,P∗), the ﬁrst argument of e C(Pτ+1
0 ,Pτ
0 ,P∗ +
δ) = e Cτ+1 is smaller while the second and third are larger. Since e C is increasing in the
second argument and decreasing in the others, it follows that the relationship between e Cτ+1
and e Cτ is ambiguous.
26e C declines slightly between τ and τ + 1, tending to reduce the default rate, but the much-
larger change in b C dominates.
27A further slight decline in e C is oﬀset by a continuing decline in b C.
28If the lender’s price expectations are myopic, with f independent of the past price history, it
can be shown analytically that convergence back to the steady state is guaranteed. We are
indebted to Pierre Picard for this demonstration, which holds in the general version of the
model.
29A relaxation of the payment-to-income constraint (an increase in α) or a decline in origination
costs k leads to a similar adjustment process. But if either of these changes is permanent, the
45steady-state is altered, in contrast to the case of a one-time expectations shock. Either change
shifts the π locus upward in Figure 3, leading to an initial expansion of subprime lending
and an increase in the house price. With the steady state altered in each case, however,
convergence to new equilibrium values occurs. The steady-state house price remains at P∗
given that neither change aﬀects the supply-demand condition (19), but the steady-state
value of b C falls when α increases or k declines. Therefore, the new steady-state equilibrium
reﬂects a permanent increase in subprime lending and a larger housing stock. Note that since
the adjustment process generated by either of these changes involves falling house prices, it
will exhibit a temporary surge in defaults like that in Figure 5.
30All these quarterly numbers are averages of monthly values.
31This evidence comes from regressions of building permits on past price appreciation. Pre-
sumably, a large volume of building permits signals optimism about future prices. In a
regression of the permit volume in state j and quarter t on past annual price appreciation
along with state and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects, the appreciation coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly positive.
This outcome emerges regardless of whether appreciation is measured through the current
quarter or whether the annual appreciation rate is lagged by two or four quarters (being
measured through quarter t − 2 or quarter t − 4). Thus, optimism about future prices, as
reﬂected in building permits, appears to be linked to past appreciation.
32Note that, among other things, state ﬁxed eﬀects capture interstate diﬀerences in lenders’
ability to recover their funds upon default, which may aﬀect lending practices (states diﬀer
in their use of judicial vs. nonjudicial foreclosure and in the recourse status of mortgages).
33This presumption could be reversed by other subtler eﬀects. For example, high unemploy-
ment could keep riskier borrowers from even entering the housing market, leading to a
positive association between risk scores and this variable. As will be seen below, the unem-
ployment coeﬃcient is almost always insigniﬁcant in the regressions, suggesting that such
oﬀsetting eﬀects may be at work.
34This AR structure can be derived from an underlying process where the autoregressive lag
is a single quarter, with ￿jt = λ￿jt−1 + ujt, where the ujt are i.i.d. error terms with variance
σ2. Successive substitution yields ￿jt = ρ￿jt−4 + vjt, where ρ = λ4 and vjt = ujt + λujt−1 +
λ2ujt−2+λ3ujt−3. In this case, the vjt’s are correlated, with E(vjt,vjt−1) = (λ+λ3+λ5)σ2,
E(vjt,vjt−2) = (λ2 + λ4)σ2, E(vjt,vjt−3) = λ3σ2, and E(vjt,vjt−k) = 0 for k > 3. In the
case where the HPICHG lag in (21) is two quarters rather than four, ￿jt = ρ￿jt−2 + vjt,
where vjt = ujt + λujt−1, E(vjt,vjt−1) = λσ2, and E(vjt,vjt−k) = 0 for k > 1.
35Since the main sources of within-state error correlation are removed by the inclusion of
state dummies and the use of an autoregressive transformation, the alternative approach of
46clustering at the state level does not appear necessary. Note that when the autoregressive
structure is generated by an underlying process with a one-quarter lag, then the error terms
vjt in (24) are correlated within each state but in a complex fashion. As seen in footnote
33, when the HPICHG lag in (21) is four quarters, the error correlation is positive when
the time index diﬀers by three or less and equals zero otherwise. When the HPICHG lag is
two quarters, the error correlation is positive when the time index diﬀers by one and equals
zero otherwise. As a result, the error structure does not have the constant error correlation
within states that justiﬁes clustering, making robust standard errors more appropriate.
36Since the model predicts that more-favorable price expectations should spur lending to the
riskiest borrowers, one might expect lagged HPICHG to have a stronger eﬀect at lower
percentiles of the risk-score distribution. A comparison of Table 3’s nonlinear four-quarter-
lag results for the 10th and 25th percentiles conﬁrms this expectation. The elasticity of the
10th percentile risk score with respect to the lagged HPICHG is more negative than the
25th percentile elasticity, an outcome that can be seen by noting that the larger absolute
value of the 25th percentile β1 is more than oﬀset by the larger 25th percentile riskscore in
the ratio used to compute the elasticity (see Table 1). In contrast, the nonlinear results with
a two-quarter lag yield elasticities that are about equal. This outcome suggests that the
ﬁrst elasticity pattern may not be robust, a conclusion that is reinforced below in the case
of ﬁrst-time buyers. The explanation could be that the 25th percentile risk score already
embraces the bulk of subprime borrowers, with impacts at the 10th percentile governed by
other considerations.
37Letting g(c) denote the density of default costs, the mean C among borrowers getting mort-
gages is Cm ≡
R ∞
b C [Cg(C)/(N − G(b C))]dC. In the case of a uniform g with support [0,C],
Cm = (b C + C)/2, so that the mean drops at half the rate at which b C declines, with b C
conversely dropping at double the rate of the mean. Generally, ∂Cm/∂b C equals (Cm − b C)
times the hazard-rate expression g(b C)/[N − G(b C)]. This hazard rate equals 1/(C − b C) in
the uniform case, yielding ∂Cm/∂b C < 1, a result that will be strengthened when the hazard
rate at b C is smaller, as will happen with a unimodal density where b C lies below the mode.
In such cases, ∂Cm/∂b C will be well below one, implying that b C drops by a multiple of any
measured decline in Cm.
38In contrast to the repeat-buyer and reﬁnancer regressions, the OLS and nonlinear results for
ﬁrst-time buyers and investors have β1 coeﬃcients of similar size, suggestion no OLS bias.
39The X variables in the second-stage equation, (21), are measured at a later time period than
those in the ﬁrst-stage equation, making the analogy to 2SLS imperfect.
40The previous discussion suggested that the Z’s would include the growth rates of the X vari-
ables along with population growth. Inspection of (23) then shows the ﬁrst-stage equation
47would contain both the levels and the growth rates of the X’s (which themselves depend on
the X levels) along with population growth. Because of this redundancy, the estimated ﬁrst
stage then contains just the X levels and the growth rate of population. Both contempora-
neous values and a one-year lag are included.
48